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Re-intermediating the councillors? Towards new connections between 
representative and participatory democracy in local government 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, many European local authorities are in a process of 
renewing their democratic institutions. First of all, new ways of involving citizens in 
policy processes have been introduced with the aim to improve the responsiveness of 
local decision making, thereby strengthening the democratic legitimacy of local 
government (Daemen and Schaap, 2000). At the same time, in several countries, like 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, major reforms have been introduced in the 
institutions governing the relationship between the council and the executive. These 
reforms are intended to revitalise representative institutions, in particular by tackling 
problems of accountability and transparency in municipal decision-making. A key 
element in these reforms is the separation of administrative and scrutiny roles between 
the executive and the council (Goss, 2001; Elzinga, 2002). 
Both strands of changes and reforms may have important consequences for the 
positions and roles of the elected representatives. The new forms of participatory 
democracy tend to challenge the political primacy of the politicians. Generally, they 
have found it hard to play a constructive role in the participatory processes (Klijn and 
Koppenjan, 2000). Furthermore, in those countries in which reforms were introduced 
in the relationship between council and executive, councillors have to re-invent their 
roles in representative politics. In this paper, I want to explore what these changes and 
challenges mean for the position of councillors as political intermediaries. My 
starting-point is the proposition that the introduction of forms of participatory 
democracy in combination with the current reforms in representative institutions may 
result in a (further) disintermediation of the councillors from the local decision-
making arenas. An institutional context may emerge, in which citizens will be induced 
to bypass the councillors and to bargain with the members of the executive and public 
officials, and in which the executive will be stimulated to take the lead in involving 
citizens in policy processes, without the interference of the council. By stating the 
research problem in this way, I look at the quality of the intermediation between 
citizens and political decision makers, rather than on (diminishing) the ‘distance’ or 
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‘gap’ between the two, or on (increasing) the involvement of citizens in local politics. 
Here, I will not dwell upon these issues from a normative perspective, but embark 
upon an empirical exploration, focusing on the position of the councillors. 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether these tendencies toward 
a disintermediation of councillors are indeed occurring and, if so, which strategies are 
pursued by the councillors to counter them. Following from this, we may address the 
question whether these strategies have the potential of establishing new, and perhaps 
better connections between participative and representative democracy in local 
government. Two local democracies will be taken as the cases for this exploration, the 
city of Almere in the Netherlands and Lewisham in the UK.  
 
The following questions will be addressed: 
(1) Which reforms have been introduced in the relationship between the council 
and the executive in the Netherlands and the UK, and what is their 
significance for the position of the councillors as democratic intermediaries? 
(2) Which opportunities are offered to citizens to participate in local policy 
processes in these countries, and how are councillors involved in this? 
(3) Which strategies are pursued by the councillors for strengthening their roles as 
intermediaries between the citizenry and the executive? 
 
These questions have to be addressed against the backdrop of societal developments 
in which a de-centring of political decision-making has taken place to arenas outside 
the direct control of elected representatives. Politics has been ‘relocated’ to 
interorganisational networks spanning different levels of government (Bovens et. al, 
1995). Here lies another dynamics that may account for a disintermediation of the 
councillors. I will address this first in the next Section. A framework will be proposed 
that pictures a coexistence of different models of democracy within a context of local 
‘governance’. Within this framework, I elaborate the disintermediation proposition. In 
Section 3, I shortly discuss the changes that are taking place in the institutions of local 
government in the Netherlands and the UK. In Section 4, I introduce the two cases. In 
Section 5, various examples of citizen involvement are examined. I look at the 
available opportunities and the strategies pursued by the councillors in the two cities 
to reinstate their roles as political intermediaries. In Section 6, I draw some 
conclusions.   
 3
  
2.Local democracy in the context of governance 
 
The idea of making connections between different democratic devices is, of course, 
not new. In his normative account of democracy, Dahl (1989) included the indirect 
mechanisms of pluralistic interest intermediation and representative democracy, as 
well as some deliberative devices. In recent discussions about democratic innovation, 
new institutional designs are searched for, in which different models of democracy 
work in ways that can be mutually supportive (Saward, 2001; see also Papadopoulos, 
2003).  
 I define democracy as ‘responsive rule’, i.e. in terms of the correspondence 
between acts of governance and the (equally weighted) felt interests of citizens with 
respect to these acts. This definition is borrowed from Saward (1989). As a 
predominantly outcomes-based definition, it can be regarded as somewhat lacking, 
because it does not indicate a mechanism for achieving responsiveness that would 
count as ‘democratic’. This, however, is the next step in the proposed 
conceptualisation. Figure 1 depicts the local democratic polity in the context of 
governance. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
On the right of this figure, the vertical, multi-level dimension of governance is 
pictured, at the bottom the horizontal dimension of cooperation between (quasi-) 
public and private agencies. At the top, I place the representative institutions and 
executive structures. The four thick arrows on the left stand for the political activities 
of citizens, either individually or via organisations. A thin arrow is added for the 
contributions of individual citizens in deliberative arrangements. 
 
I distinguish six democratic regimes, each providing a specific mechanism and 
appropriate institutions for achieving responsiveness. Each regime also embodies 
certain values about the way in which political conflicts should be resolved, thereby 
pointing to certain norms pertaining to the quality of democratic intermediation.1 I 
place deliberative democracy in the centre of this figure, within or in the immediate 
                                                 
1 For an exploration of this, in the context of deliberative democracy, with regard to the role of the 
moderator, see: Edwards (2002). 
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environment of the interorganisational networks in which public policies are 
formulated and implemented. It includes all those arrangements in which citizens can 
discuss public issues, and exchange their views with politicians and officials 
representing the various agencies that are involved in public policies. Examples are 
round table conferences, citizen juries and policy exercises on the Internet. Pluralist 
democracy constitutes the arena in which interest groups, social movements, and 
other citizens’ initiatives articulate citizens’ concerns and demands, and try to 
influence the political agenda-setting and decision-making. Pluralist democracy and 
deliberative democracy involve the citizens as active participants or co-producers of 
public policies. In competitive democracy (Miller, 1983) political parties or individual 
candidates compete for legislative and executive offices. This form of democracy 
overlaps ‘representative democracy’ as it denotes both the election of councillors and 
the direct election of executives. In contrast, direct democracy provides the citizenry 
with opportunities to make their own binding collective decisions on specific issues. 
Competitive democracy and direct democracy involve the citizen in his role as a 
voter. Lastly, customer democracy addresses citizens in their role of service users. It 
provides them, individually or in their client associations, with opportunities to give 
feedback on public service delivery. In associative democracy, service provision is 
devolved to self-governing associations functioning internally as representative, 
deliberative or direct democracies. This model of democracy also includes the 
arrangements of self-government in neighbourhoods (Hirst 1994).  
Within this framework, we can situate the main forces that may account for a 
disintermediation of the council from the local decision-making arenas: 
• The de-centring of collective decision-making to interorganisational networks;  
• The differentiation of the local polity into different democratic regimes, with 
different intermediaries, constituting different ‘markets for political activism’ 
(Richardson, 1995); 
• The emergence of arrangements for the direct election of executives, notably 
the directly elected mayor. 
 
Against the disintermediation scenario, however, we have to posit the strategies that 
may be available for the elected representatives to re-intermediate themselves, thereby 
re-inventing their representative roles in a changing institutional context. In the recent 
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e-commerce literature, from which I borrow the idea of an ‘intermediation-
disintermediation-reintermediation’ cycle, the attention has shifted from the early 
proposition that electronic transactions would lead to the elimination of intermediaries 
to a more careful analysis of different institutional conditions and available strategies 
for old (and new!) intermediaries in electronic markets (Giaglis, Klein and O’Keefe, 
2002; Chircu and Kauffman, 1999; Sarkar, Butler and Steinfeld, 1996). In this line, I 
concur with Goss (2001), who redefines the councillors’ roles as those of a 
caseworker, an advocate, a broker or a facilitator: 
 
“ In a world in which direct and participatory democracy coexists with 
representative democracy the role of a representative changes, and becomes 
one of ringholder, advocate, broker, listening to and bringing together the 
views of different communities. The job of the representative becomes that of 
integrating different sorts of democracy and different sources of democratic 
legitimacy” (p. 135). 
 
In this paper, I want to make a start with unravelling the dynamics that may hinder or 
further such a development. 
 
 
3. The institutional context: reforms in local government in the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom 
 
The Netherlands 
Around the beginning of the 1990s, the local politicians in the Netherlands felt a 
growing concern about the legitimacy of local government. A crucial factor was the 
1990 local elections, in which the turnout of just above 60% was perceived as 
dramatically low and as an ominous sign for the involvement of citizens in local 
politics. The local authorities responded with trying various devices for involving 
citizens in the policy process. The experiments with ‘city talks’, ‘round table 
conferences’ and the like gave rise to a deliberative practice of  ‘interactive 
governance’, which is now a common phenomenon in Dutch local government. Until 
now, the experiences are, in terms of increased participation, real influence on 
political decision-making, quality of policies and public support, rather mixed, but it 
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is still too early to designate this practice as a complete failure or success (Edelenbos 
and Monnikhof, 2001). Rather, it should be regarded as a learning process in which 
the conditions are explored for its appropriate usage and implementation. 
Furthermore, several Dutch municipalities introduced the referendum as a device of 
direct democracy. Lastly, the Dutch municipalities embarked on a process of 
innovating their public service delivery, which includes new instruments for feedback 
and participation of service users. However, a more or less comprehensive practice of 
‘customer democracy’, as seems to exist in the UK, did not arise in the Netherlands.    
Since 2002, Dutch local government is undergoing a reform process that is aimed 
at a major renewal of local politics. This reform was the result of the 
recommendations made by a state commission, which pleaded for a stronger 
‘visibility’ of local politics (Staatscommissie ‘Dualisme en lokale democratie’, 2000). 
Research had established that the most important political decisions took place behind 
the closed doors of the meetings of the political groups in the council. In particular, an 
institutional intertwining had grown between the parties forming the majority 
coalition and the executive. The core reforms are intended to strengthen the scrutiny 
role of the council towards the executive, thereby revitalising the councillors’ roles as 
representatives of the voters. Basically, these reforms involve a renewal of the local 
political culture, but the most important changes that were introduced in this so-called 
‘dualisation’ process are legal changes in the structure of local government (Derksen 
and Schaap, 2004): 
- The aldermen are no longer council members. They are still appointed by the 
council, but after their appointment their council membership expires. 
Moreover, aldermen can be appointed from outside the council.   
- The roles of the executive and the council are separated. The role of the 
executive is exclusively administration, whereas the council roles are focused 
on representation of the people, establishing general policy frameworks, and 
scrutiny. As a result of this repositioning of roles, several administrative 
competences were transferred by law to the executive board. At the same time, 
the council received several new instruments, for instance the right to initiate 
an inquiry. 
- The council has got the right to provide itself with official assistance. In each 
municipality a ‘council registrar’ is appointed. The council has the freedom of 
deciding on the size and substance of the registrar function. 
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- Each municipality has to establish an audit function, either in the form of an 
independent auditor’s office or an audit commission of the council. 
 
In contrast to the UK, the position and way of appointing the mayor were not included 
in the reforms. In the Netherlands, the Crown appoints the mayors. Gradually, a 
practice has come into being in which the local council has a formal position in the 
procedure, and can exert a major influence on the appointment decision. In 2004, the 
new Dutch cabinet has proposed a draft bill for a directly elected mayor. This reform 
would have important consequences for the relationship between council and 
executive in Dutch local government.   
 
United Kingdom 
Local politics has been losing legitimacy in the UK since the 1970s. As Goss (2001: 
118) has indicated, with turnouts of around 30% fewer people voted in British local 
elections than almost anywhere else in Europe. The Conservative governments 
attempted to increase the involvement of citizens in local government, addressing 
them primarily in their role of service users. Citizens were invited to participate in the 
assessment of public services or in the management of organisations involved in 
public service delivery. The subsequent Labour governments have extended this 
agenda by addressing the citizen also in his political roles. New methods of consulting 
citizens, such as citizen juries and citizen panels were introduced. 
The Labour government has included the renewal of the democratic institutions of 
local government within its programme to modernise public administration. In its 
White Paper on local government, the Blair government criticised the traditional 
committee system for being inefficient and intransparent, leading to a situation of 
distorted priorities and decisions taken behind the closed doors of party meetings 
DETR; Noppe and Ringeling, 2001). Local authorities were required to separate 
executive and scrutiny roles. The new powers of the councillors include scrutiny, 
‘community leadership’, and certain regulatory powers: 
- All councils have to provide maintaining and review of executive policies and 
activities. They have to establish a scrutiny commission made up of 
councillors who are not members of the executive or cabinet. 
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- Community leadership involves taking ‘a comprehensive view of the needs 
and priorities of local areas and lead in the work that is needed to meet these 
needs’.  
- The councils retain the power to make quasi-judicial decisions on how to 
apply regulations to specific local matters, such as planning and licensing 
decisions (LGA, website).   
 
Furthermore, the Blair government offered three models for structuring the executive 
and its relationship with the council (DETR, 1998): 
(1) A directly elected mayor heading a cabinet. The mayor appoints a cabinet 
from the members of the council; 
(2) A leader with a cabinet. The council elects the leader. The other cabinet 
members are chosen from the members of the council by the council or the 
leader. 
(3) A directly elected mayor with a council manager. 
 
For smaller local governments, a fourth alternative was added, allowing for the 
preservation of an adapted version of the old committee system, if this was supported 
in a citizen consultation. Most councils have chosen for the second model (Wilson, 
2002). Lewisham was one of the few municipalities that opted for the first alternative.  
 
In their focus on the relationship between the council and the executive, the proposed 
reforms in the two countries, as well as the arguments underlying them, bear some 
striking similarities.2 The same holds true for some of the criticism they met in the 
scholarly literature. According to Wilson (2002), the Labour reforms, in particular the 
option of a directly elected mayor, may lead to a more elitist decision-making, with 
the result of marginalising the ‘ordinary councillors’. In the same vein, some Dutch 
commentators have argued that the dualisation process in the Netherlands will result 
in a further shift of power towards the executive (Derksen, 2000). 
 
 
4. The cases: Almere and Lewisham 
                                                 
2 There are also important differences. For instance, the members of the cabinets in the UK keep their 
council membership. 
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 Within the similar discourses and institutional contexts described above, two cases 
were selected which are rather dissimilar in their specific constitution of the council-
executive relationship, namely Almere in the Netherlands and Lewisham in the UK. 
In this respect, they are not representative for the entirety of municipalities in the two 
countries. As noted above, Lewisham was one of the few municipalities in the UK 
that opted for a directly elected mayor. But Almere, too, can be regarded as a special 
case in the Dutch context. With some of its innovations, the Almere Council has gone 
farther than any other municipality in the Netherlands. 3
 
Almere 
Situated some 25 kilometres east from Amsterdam, Almere is a new town with a 
current population of 173,000 inhabitants. In the next 20 years, Almere is expected to 
grow further to one of the largest municipalities in the Netherlands. 
The Council consists of 39 members. The executive board (with six aldermen) 
is a broad coalition of the Labour Party (two aldermen), the local party ‘Livable 
Almere’ (two members), the Christian Democrats and GreenLeft (each with one 
alderman). Since 2004, the Almere Council uses a new form for its council work.The 
traditional commission and council meetings have been replaced by a weekly 
‘Political Market’. The first part of the evening is a kind of roundabout of activities 
focused on ‘research and preparation’. Different issues are treated in separate (but 
adjacent) rooms. The activities vary from reading documents or consulting experts to 
having discussions with civil servants, members of the Executive, citizens and social 
organisations. The second part of the evening is intended for political debate and final 
decision-making. With this formula, the Political Market also serves as a channel for 
citizens for influencing local politics. During the first part of the evening, the 
councillors, civil servants, Mayor and aldermen are directly approachable for citizens. 
A tight management of the agenda provides clarity and certainty on which issues are 
discussed, when and where. Furthermore, citizens who assembled at least 50 
signatures can put an issue on the agenda (a so-called citizen activity’).    
 
                                                 
3 The information in the Sections 4 and 5 is based on official documents and (when indicated) on 
information on the municipalities’ websites. Interviews were held with the registrar of the Almere 
Council and with the Head of Community Governance and Public Management in Lewisham. 
 10
 Lewisham  
Lewisham is a borough within the Greater London Area, with a current population of 
246,000 inhabitants. The Council consists of 54 members, three elected by each of the 
18 wards within the borough. The council is overwhelmingly Labour controlled (42 
councillors). In 2002, Lewisham elected Steve Bullock as its first directly elected 
mayor. He has appointed a Cabinet of nine councillors to assist him in decision-
making and policy proposal. Those members of the Council who are not in the 
Cabinet have the task of overview and scrutiny. These members form Select 
Committees for this work, and also a Business Panel which coordinates the Select 
Committees and holds the power of call-in over executive decisions.  In the UK, 
Lewisham has a reputation as one of the forerunners in consultation procedures with 
citizens. Recently, a special consultation website has been set up about all the 
Lewisham’s consultations since January 2004, including their results and ‘how 
citizens’ views have informed the decision making process’ (www.lewisham.gov.uk) 
 
 
5. The cases examined: Disintermediation tendencies, re-intermediation strategies 
 
In Section 1, I distinguished three sorts of dynamics that bear upon the 
position of the councillors in the intermediation between citizens and decision-makers 
in local governance. In this Section, I examine various examples of citizen 
involvement in the two cities, which can be taken as indicative for this.4 Together, the 
examples should give us the indications needed to infer whether the disintermediation 
scenario seems to hold true or that a re-intermediation may occur. A disintermediation 
can be observed when in the ‘linkage chain’ (Lawson, 1988) between the expression 
of preferences by the citizens and the final decision-making, the councillors tend to be 
eliminated, giving way to direct interactions between the citizens and the decision-
makers or to the inclusion of other intermediaries. First, I look at the intermediation 
from the council towards the executive. Then I look at some practices in the broader 
context of ‘governance’. 
                                                 
4 These are all the examples mentioned by the two interviewees in the two cities. 
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In Almere, the Political Market provides a new channel for citizens to forward 
their concerns and interests. A first evaluation (Gemeente Almere, 2004) suggests that 
the Political Market attracts more citizens to the town hall, and also improves the 
relation between citizens and councillors. Of course, the open formula implies that 
besides the councillors, the visitors can also approach the civil servants, the aldermen 
and the mayor. In this respect, the council functions as a kind of ‘host’ for the citizens 
and the other players involved in the municipal decision-making.5 An advantage for 
the councillors is that the meetings now run parallel with the meetings of the 
executive. Before, the plenary council meetings were held only once a month. At the 
same time, because of the abolition of the committee meetings, there seems to be a net 
time gain that can be used for external contacts with citizens and organisations.6 The 
possibility for citizens to forward an issue on the agenda of the Political Market, with 
the aim of stopping a pending decision of the Executive, was used twice since its 
incipience in early 2004. The first ‘citizen activity’ was an initiative of residents to 
preserve the plane-trees in an avenue in their neighbourhood, the second one was an 
initiative to preserve the so-called ‘city-meadows’. In both cases, councillors stepped 
into these issues vis-à-vis the Executive.  
In Lewisham, the main access-points for the citizens are the surgeries of their 
ward councillors and the local Area Forums. There are six Area Forums, each made 
up of three wards. The meetings are arranged by the councillors as a way to listen 
about the local issues that concern citizens. In the plenary council meetings, which are 
held once in two months, councillors have the opportunity to present petitions on 
behalf of the residents. Common petitions concern local traffic problems and road 
safety. In the coming period, the councillors will run across a powerful competitor in 
their wards. Between September 2004 and December 2005, the mayor will visit each 
of the 18 wards to meet residents, community representatives, schools and businesses. 
These visits can be interpreted as leading towards disintermediation, although they 
could also function as a catalyst for re-intermediation strategies, depending, for 
instance, on the room left to the councillors for an active involvement in the 
                                                 
5 One alderman told that since the start of the Political Market the number of visitors of his surgeries 
sharply diminished (VNG Magazine, 12 March 2004). Further research would be needed to establish 
whether the Political Market only has a substitution effect or results in a net gain in interactions with 
citizens, and how this is distributed between councillors and members of the executive. 
6 Of the councillors who participated in the evaluation, 49% indicated that they now spend as much 
time, and 39% even more time to their council work. However, 49% of the councillors also indicated 
that they have now more time for external contacts with citizens and organisations (p. 7). 
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preparation of the visits and their follow up. [to expand on in a later version of this 
paper]     
The mobilisation of citizen input for the scrutiny function might be one of the 
most promising opportunities for councillors to reinstate their position in the decision-
making arena and to connect them to the wider community (Goss, 2001). In both 
cities such a practice has to develop as yet. In Almere, the Political Market can serve 
this function on specific issues. Besides, the Almere Council intends to set up 
‘monitoring groups’ (volggroepen) for specific (large) policy projects. These groups 
will have discussions with the professionals involved in the implementation and 
service provision, target groups and experts. By ‘giving the floor’ to the involved 
professionals and citizens, and consolidating their contributions in the evaluation 
report, the councillors would take on a facilitator or moderator role. The Council’s 
scrutiny role also includes the way in which consultation procedures are implemented 
by the municipal agencies. At the time of writing this paper, the local Auditor’s Office 
is conducting a comprehensive review, which will be discussed in the council. [to 
expand on in a later version of this paper]   
In Lewisham, the overview and scrutiny functions are carried out in seven 
Select Committees and in the Business Panel. The Business Panel meetings have a 
predominantly formal nature. In the Select Committees substantive discussions may 
take place about reviews, audits etc.7 A Select Committee may also question the 
mayor about his views and policy ambitions. Third, they may discuss the reports of 
citizen consultations. In September 2004, a consultation procedure has started about 
the Controlled Parking Zones. A citizen jury addresses the general issue of ‘the Place 
of the Car in Lewisham’. The feedback will be given to the Executive, which will 
develop proposals for specific areas. These proposals will be discussed with the 
residents and businesses in the areas. The final decision will be taken by the mayor, 
but with a scrutiny moment for the council. 
 The Almere Council experimented two times with the ‘Talk with the Council’ 
formula. The purpose of these consultations was to form an independent judgment 
and then to discuss the matter with the Executive. Members of the Executive are 
invited to be present at the meeting, but are not allowed to participate. Councillors 
may give them the floor at the end of the meeting if they (the councillors) have any 
                                                 
7 For instance, in the Children and Young People Select Committee meeting on 14 September 2004 a 
School Effectiveness Annual Report was discussed.  
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specific questions. In both cases, the issues were matters of the Executive, namely the 
building of a mosque and the relocation of a school. Both issues had aroused some 
unrest in the city, upon which the Executive chose to leave room to the Council (and 
even suggested the Council) to enter into talks with the residents. On the second issue, 
the procedure resulted in the assignment of another location than previously indicated 
by the Executive. This result could be clearly attributed to the contribution of citizens. 
In these instances, the councillors performed a kind of mediator role, which put them, 
of course, in a field of tension between the citizens and the executive. 
We now turn to the involvement of the councillors within the broader context 
of governance. In the period 2002-2003, the Almere Council arranged a ‘discussion 
with the city’ about youth policy. Youth policy can be regarded as a typical 
governance issue, in which the municipality has a mediating and coordinating role 
towards the various institutions in the sectors of culture, care, education and law and 
order. In its ‘council programme’, youth policy was designed as a special theme for 
that year. The formulation of a special theme for the year was regarded as one of the 
new work strategies of the Council in the ‘dual’ system of local government. 
Discussions were held with the involved institutions and young people in the city. The 
council formulated a document with policy recommendations for the Executive. The 
Executive incorporated these recommendations in an own policy document. The way 
in which the Executive dealt with the recommendations provoked a discussion with 
the Council. According to the Council, the alderman went its own way with the 
recommendations instead of translating them directly into policy proposals. 
A good example of ‘governance’ in Lewisham is the Lewisham Strategic 
Partnership (LSP). The LSP brings together representatives from the public, private, 
voluntary and community sector. It has the broad aim ‘to deliver improvements in the 
social, economic and environmental wellbeing of all those who live, work and study 
in the borough’. The LSP is presided by the Mayor. In addition to the mayor, the 
council is present in the Board with three members of the Cabinet. 
The tasks of the LSP include the following: 
• To prepare and implement a Community Strategy; 
• To develop and deliver a local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy ‘to secure 
more jobs, better education, improved health, reduced crime and better 
housing’ (www.lewishamstrategicpartnership.org.uk).  
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 Neighbourhood renewal is about improving the most disadvantaged and needy 
communities in Lewisham. The LSP has set up Neighbourhood Management 
structures in these areas, including a ‘neighbourhood manager’. A body called the 
Service Providers Panel acts as a ‘go between to ensure that experiences and 
information from the areas is fed back to the LSP’ (website LSP). In this case we see 
that a new structure of intermediation is created, in which the ward councillors do not 
seem to be included. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this paper was an exploration of the consequences of two strands of 
institutional renewal, the introduction of forms of participatory democracy and 
reforms in the relationship between the council and the executive, for the position of 
the councillors as intermediaries between citizens and decision-makers in local 
governance. I looked at practices of citizen involvement in two cities in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In their focus on the separation of 
administrative and scrutiny roles between the executive and the council, the 
institutional reforms in these countries share a similar direction. Within this context, 
two cases were selected, Almere and Lewisham, which are dissimilar in their 
constitution of the relationship between council and executive, the main difference 
being that Lewisham has opted for a directly elected mayor who has appointed a 
cabinet of (nine) councillors to assist him in his decision-making.  
Our exploration reveals a strikingly different picture between the two cities. In 
Almere, the Council has put a lot of energy in adapting its work strategies and 
methods vis-à-vis the Executive and in its own consultations with the citizenry. We 
see the contours of the roles of a ‘host’, advocate, facilitator, mediator and broker. In 
Lewisham, I observe a clear trend towards a disintermediation of the council. 
Wilson’s proposition that the Labour reforms, in particular the option of a directly 
elected mayor, would lead to a marginalisation of the ‘ordinary councillors’ seems to 
come out. The addition ‘ordinary’ is essential here, because of the special position of 
the councillors in the Cabinet, who (in contrast to the Dutch aldermen who were 
initially elected in the council) preserve their Council membership.  
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Still, the Lewisham case does not allow us to infer that there is a necessary 
causal link between the institutional conditions given by the option of the directly 
elected mayor and the disintermediation of the Council. Rather, the Almere case 
suggests that the strategies pursued by the councillors may have a major influence on 
the outcome. In the interview in Lewisham, the viewpoint was brought out that the 
councillors should concentrate their energies in the wards, reaching out to the people, 
stirring their participation in consultation procedures, representing their views in the 
central decision making (‘these are the voices’), thereby working strategic issues out 
of small concerns. Still, one could maintain that the conditions for this are less 
conducive in Lewisham than in Almere. In Almere, to be sure, several autonomous 
factors, such as the creativity and driving-power of the Council registrar and the 
council presidium, as well as the personal support of the Mayor, have contributed to 
the innovations (although also these factors can be related to certain institutional 
conditions!). It is, therefore, too early to come to definitive conclusions on this issue.   
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